Real Options Analysis for Acquisition of New Technology: A Case Study of Korea K2 Tank's Powerpack by Kim, Sungchul et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2018
Real Options Analysis for Acquisition of New
Technology: A Case Study of Korea K2 Tank's Powerpack
Kim, Sungchul; Giachetti, Ronald; Park, Sangsung
MDPI
Kim, Sungchul, Ronald Giachetti, and Sangsung Park. "Real Options Analysis for
Acquisition of New Technology: A Case Study of Korea K2 Tanks Powerpack."
Sustainability 10.11 (2018): 3866.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61102
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
sustainability
Article
Real Options Analysis for Acquisition of New
Technology: A Case Study of Korea K2
Tank’s Powerpack
Sungchul Kim 1, Ronald Giachetti 2 and Sangsung Park 3,*
1 Defense Agency for Technology and Quality, 420, Dongjin-ro, Jinju-si, Gyeongsangnam-do 52851, Korea;
sungchul.kim74@gmail.com
2 Department of Systems Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School, 777 Dyer Rd, Monterey, CA 94943, USA;
regiache@nps.edu
3 Graduate School of Management of Technology, Korea University, Seoul 136-701, Korea
* Correspondence: hanyul@korea.ac.kr; Tel.: +82-2-3290-3900
Received: 28 September 2018; Accepted: 22 October 2018; Published: 24 October 2018


Abstract: For sustainable defense management, it is essential to acquire weapons systems that can adapt to
future uncertain threats and, at the same time, to invest efficiently with limited budgets. Economic analysis
is used to examine the costs, benefits and uncertainties of alternatives. In particular, the use of the real
options valuation, which is one of the methodologies of economic analysis, is expanding. The real options
valuation has shown effectiveness across various industries to evaluate investment strategies. In this paper,
we apply the real options valuation to the weapon systems development case and confirm its usefulness.
Unlike previous studies, the real option valuation methodology is applied retroactively to the finished
project, compared to existing research mainly applying real options to value research and development
(R&D) without knowing how the project completed. We use the following procedure. (1) Define the
uncertainties of the three acquisition alternatives (development, technology adoption, and purchase).
(2) Calculate the benefits of the three acquisition alternatives with expected and actual data without
uncertainties. (3) Model the decision tree without options and with options. (4) Analyze and compare
results with benefit and benefit cost ratio. We analyzed the Korea K2 tank powerpack development case
by applying real options. We could see that the real options could have reduced the risk of losses when
the development risk is high and market uncertainty exists. From the case study of the development of
the powerpack, we learned the following three lessons. First, we reaffirmed the importance of objective
value analysis in project decision making. Second, we need to analyze the project value continuously
and revise the acquisition strategy accordingly. Third, the effectiveness of the real options valuation was
confirmed for sustainable defense management. In addition, the real option analysis data acquired from
similar finished projects can be useful for establishing a new product acquisition strategy and, at every
decision-making phase, the real option evaluation should be continuously performed with updated
information. In this paper, we first perform real option valuation of finished weapon systems in the
Korean defense field. This paper is valuable in establishing a rational methodology for applying economic
analysis to weapon system acquisition projects.
Keywords: sustainable defense management; real options; discounted cash flow; net present value;
benefit valuation; K2 tank; powerpack
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1. Introduction
Defense projects are different from other industrial projects in at least two important respects.
First, defense projects are usually large, complex, and interdisciplinary. Second, they use state-of-the-art
technologies to achieve the required operational performance, thus increasing the technology risk
involved in their execution [1].
Dealing with the technological risk leads to a variety of analyses to enable decision makers
to choose a rational acquisition strategy. Examples are technical forecasting and economic analysis.
Technology forecasting activities are carried out on core technologies, and economic analysis is widely
used for weapons systems development. Technology forecasting applies systematized knowledge to
manage technology efficiently in the future [2,3]. Technology forecasting is an important job for R&D
planning and technology strategies in a company. Various methods have been used for this purpose.
Daim et al. (2011) compiled and provided technology forecasting papers using information technology [4].
Robinson et al. (2013) proposed a framework using various analysis and tools [5]. Cunningham et al.
(2011) used number of papers [6]. Sasaki et al. (2013) used citation data from the Institute for Scientific
Information’s DB [7]. Jun et al. (2012, 2014) utilized patent information [8,9]. Most companies and nations
would like to improve their competitiveness in national defense. Furthermore, they want to sustain the
technological competitiveness for national defense [10]. Economic analysis is an umbrella term for any
type of analysis examining the costs, benefits and uncertainties of alternative ways of achieving a given
objective or fulfilling a need. An economic analysis is a systematic approach to choosing the best method
of allocating scarce resources to achieve a given objective. This analytical approach does not replace the
judgment of the decision maker, but rather aids and informs the decision [11]. Discount Cash Flow (DCF)
is commonly used as an economic analysis technique. In recent years, the real options valuation that
converts project decisions into value is spreading [12].
DCF is a useful valuation technique when the occurrence of future cash flows is deterministic,
but it is of limited value when there is uncertainty about the business. Various research cases point out
that traditional DCF methods may fail to consider the flexibility of a project to revise decisions after a
project begins [13–16]. That is, the traditional DCF approach does not capture the realistic valuation of
an investment because it does not explicitly account for the value of real options inherent in capital
budgeting. Consequently, DCF techniques often fail to provide sound valuation when the business
environment is uncertain and forgo the value created by flexibility in management decisions [17–19].
In the real options valuation, uncertainty can sometimes be perceived as an opportunity for
an enterprise, because it assesses the value of flexible decision-makings in an uncertain business
environment. By using real options, guidance can be provided on a variety of flexible decisions,
including whether to implement new projects, or to decide whether to continue, expand, or reduce
existing projects. In real options, these decisions have value, and careful decision-making guidelines
are provided in that the result of the one made decision is irreversible. In other words, the right
decision, which is overlooked in DCF, is interpreted as one option value [20–22].
We applied the real options valuation to the weapons systems development case and confirmed
its usefulness in supporting flexible decision-making.
2. Background
The theoretical basis of the real options valuation model has been developed from financial options.
Merton (1969) and Black and Scholes (1973) developed a pricing model for financial options from the
early 1970s [23,24]. In the 1980s, the real options valuation began to be used for real assets rather than
financial assets. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) conducted studies
on the development of natural resources [25,26]. Since then, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) integrated
the various real options theory and application examples developed in the past, so that the real
options technique has become more popular in academic and practical fields [20]. In particular,
it was actively used as an evaluation tool for R&D project investment [27]. In the 2000s, real options
have been used to ensure optimal design options for the system [28,29], which is referred to as real
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“in” options [30]. In addition, considering all modules constituting a system as an option in an
economic sense, Architecture Options (AO) are studied. The purpose of AO is to identify an optimal
system architecture in terms of “adaptability attributes” that support recurring, originally unforeseen,
upgrades of the system [31,32].
There are various pricing models for estimating the value of options in the real options valuation,
which are more complex to calculate than DCF. Real options pricing models include the Black–Scholes
model, lattices model, and Monte Carlo simulation. Each pricing model has advantages and limitations,
so it is used depending on the characteristics of the analysis target [33,34]. In particular, Monte Carlo
simulation is used when the variable is stochastically variable. Scott (1987) examined the pricing of
European call options on stocks that have variance rates that change randomly [35]. Boyle et al. (1997)
reviewed the Monte Carlo approach and described some recent applications in the finance area [36].
Cheah et al. (2006) applied Monte Carlo simulation for pricing of the Malaysia–Singapore Second
Crossing bridge options [37]. Mun (2006) provided a Monte Carlo simulation guide and software [38].
Bashiri et al. (2018) presented the idea of fitting optimal decision making boundaries to optimize the
expected value, based on Monte Carlo simulated stochastic processes [39].
The real options valuation has shown effectiveness across various industries to evaluate discrete,
long-term investment strategies [40,41]. Recently, Pellegrino et al. (2018) used a real option valuation
on the commodity price volatility mitigation in supply chain [42]. Ranieri et al. (2018) developed a real
options-based model for comparing technologies that can flexibly cope with organic waste variations
in the urban waste management system investment [43]. For reference, it should be emphasized that
real option valuation is used for decision making with investments. Habib et al. (2017) optimized
future uncertain debris processing, but no investment exists [44]. For analysis of real options in R&D,
decision trees in combination with discounted cash flow analysis to determine the current values of
future states of the systems are the best available techniques [19,45].
The real option is currently being actively used in the field of defense weapons systems R&D.
Naval ships are pursuing modular design to ensure flexibility and adaptability in response to uncertain
future threats [46]. Real option valuation is used to analyze the economic value of modularization
options. Addler et al. (2007) analyzed the potential benefits of open architecture in the AEGIS software
maintenance and upgrade process [47]. Engel and Browing (2008) showed that the adaptability of
the system increases its lifetime value [31]. To cope with uncertainties in the future maritime domain,
Buurman et al. (2009) also showed that modular designs are worth more than fixed designs [19].
They also used it to select weapons systems application technology [48] and in every decision stage in
terms of Weapon System Acquisition management. It can be used to supplement acquisition strategies
continuously and actively, using updated information [49,50].
For sustainable defense management [10], it is essential to acquire weapons systems that can
adapt to future uncertain threats and, at the same time, to invest efficiently with limited budgets.
To this end, it is clear that the real option valuation methodology, which has been verified in various
cases, must be applied to weapons systems R&D.
Countries such as Korea desire to build their defense design, development, and production
capabilities rather than rely on other countries to provide weapons for its defense. Developing its
indigenous capabilities carries much more risk than the purchase of proven foreign weapons systems.
A problem facing acquisition decision makers is how to identify and evaluate acquisition strategies
that balance the needs of developing indigenous capabilities while also delivering needed capability,
through weapons, to the military on schedule and under budget.
3. Acquisition Decisions: The Case of Korea K2 Tank’s Powerpack
The K2 Blank Panther is a South Korean battle tank that started development in 1995. The Koreans
benchmarked and borrowed ideas from overseas, such as the 120-millimeter gun from Germany,
the autoloader from France, the fire control system from France, and the powerpack from Germany.
The powerpack is a module of the powertrain. The powerpack contains the engine, transmission,
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and integrative components and can be easily removed and/or replaced, making maintenance on tanks
easier. The powerpack for the K2 is based on the MTU890 v12 diesel engine with 1500 horsepower.
It was the domestic design, development, and production of the powerpack that caused significant
delays in the K2 program [51]. We use the K2 program to illustrate and explore how real options can
inform acquisition decisions.
The Korean Defense Ministry faced three alternatives (listed as A, B, and C) to obtain a powerpack.
A: Develop the Powerpack. There are advantages of the unit cost, life cycle cost, securing the
technology and export. However, there is a risk of failure.
• Unit Cost: The powerpack’s estimated unit cost if developed is $1.1M (million), whereas the
purchased powerpack cost is $1.4M. Therefore, it is expected that the development will gain
$0.3M benefit per unit compared to purchased cost. The greater is the quantity of production,
the greater the benefit would be.
• Life Cycle Cost: Korea receives several benefits from domestic production such as the ability to
easily solve problems or repair powerpacks during field operation. it can speed up equipment
operation rate and shorten time for battle readiness by rapid comprehensive logistics support.
In addition, in the future, it will be possible to reduce the maintenance cost of weapons systems
operation by developing domestic powerpack series through sequencing of self-propelled artillery,
landed armored vehicle, etc. According to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s
announcement, the investment effect of the K2 tank development program is $3B (billion) in
budget cuts, $800M worth of military power builds, and 5401 jobs creation [52,53]. Of course,
this number can vary depending on the quantity of production, but it is clear that there is an
additional benefit of domestic development.
• Securing the Technology and Export: When developing a weapons system by introducing core
sub-systems or core technologies, the export of the weapons system must be approved by the core
technology holder’s government. In the worst case, exporting weapons systems may not be possible.
To prevent these problems, core technology development is essential. The secured technology can also
be used in other fields. For example, Korea was in the process of signing a contract in 2000 to export
K9 self-propelled artillery to Turkey. However, MTU, Germany, notified Korea that it cannot approve
the export of the K9 engine. Eventually, the problem was resolved, but the Korean government was
concerned that the same situation could arise when exporting K2 tanks.
• Risk of Failure: Korea has not developed a high-power, high-reliability powerpack of
1500 horsepower. In addition, the K2 tank would be mass-produced in 2011 with the developed
powerpack after completion of development in 2008. Therefore, the development schedule was
very tight, and it was very likely that the schedule would not be met. In developed countries,
it took more than 10 years to develop a 1500-horsepower engine.
B: Introduce Powerpack Technology. The risk of development can be reduced, but exports are limited.
• Reduce risk of Development: Korea has developed and operated powerpacks of less than
1000 horsepower, but the powerpacks of more than 1000 horsepower have relied on overseas
purchase due to lack of technology, high development cost and lack of economic efficiency.
Therefore, based on the technology and production capacity accumulated in the 1000-horsepower
powerpack, the introduction of 1500-horsepower powerpack technology from overseas countries
can greatly enhance the development potential. In addition, domestic production can secure a
certain level of 1500-horsepower powerpack technology.
• Export Limit: The introduction of technology can lead to difficulties in exporting such weapons
system, e.g., the K9 self-propelled artillery. However, the exports issue would be resolved if the export
agreement is specified in the technology-introducing contract or exporting the K2 tank, except for
the powerpack.
C: Purchase all Powerpacks. Although the risk of development can be avoided, export and
domestic technology securing is limited.
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• Avoid Risk: The Korean Ministry of National Defense can secure the powerpack on time for mass
production of the K2 tank. It is a good alternative when the quantity of mass production is low
and the technical difficulty is high.
• Export Limit and No Technology Securing: As with the introduction of technology, exports can
be limited. In addition, because there is no domestic production, even if K2 tank production is
increased, there is no benefit in Korea.
The Korea DoD finally decided on Alternative A, to develop the powerpack in 2004 and contracted
with developers in 2005.
3.1. Uncertainties
This section describes common uncertainties in the acquisition process of weapons systems.
1. R&D Uncertainty: The following risks are included.
• Technology Risk: Making a reliable military grade powerpack is a challenging, high
technology endeavor. There was no Korean manufacturer with experience in the
development of powerpacks. Korean automakers, which have technology to develop
engines and transmissions, are not interested in powerpacks because tank powerpacks
are not marketable. Consequently, no Korean developer has experience in making tank
powerpacks consisting of high-power diesel engines and transmissions.
• Schedule Risk: The six-year development period is set to meet the production stage of the
K2 tank. Developed countries took 10 years to develop the powerpack. It is very likely that the
project will be delayed.
• Project Budget Risk: Government R&D budget is limited. Developers must cover their own
costs when development is delayed. This risk must be considered with Schedule Risk.
2. Market Uncertainty:
• Quantity Risk: The Korean government has a limited budget for weapons systems and
defense priorities may shift over time. The attack helicopter, the AH-64 Series (South Korea
decided to purchase 36 AH-64E attack helicopters in 2013), is a competitor to the production
volume of the K2 tank. A risk is the procurement number of tanks decreases, which would
result in the development costs being amortized over fewer tanks, thus a higher per unit cost.
Table 1 shows the R&D risks exist only for the development alternative. The technology
introduction alternative has very low risk because it is based on Korea’s powerpack development
and production technology of less than 1000 horsepower and introduces 1500-horsepower powerpack
technology. The purchase alternative has no development risk because a proven powerpack would be
purchased from a foreign contractor. A German MTU engine and the RENK transmission were used in
the K2 tank development. The market risk is due to externalities to the program and consequently
equal among all three alternatives.
Table 1. Uncertainties of Solutions.
Risks Development Technology Introduction Purchase
R&D
Technology Risk Engine High Very Low None
Transmission High Very Low None
Schedule Risk
Engine High Very Low None
Transmission High Very Low None
Budget Risk Engine High Very Low None
Transmission High Very Low None
Market
Quantity Risk Engine Medium Medium Medium
Transmission Medium Medium Medium
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3.2. Expected Benefit
We calculated the expected benefit of K2 powerpack development without uncertainties and
with uncertainties.
3.2.1. Without Uncertainties
This section analyzes the three alternatives assuming no uncertainty or risk. In the analysis,
we use the purchase alternative as the baseline for comparison because it is the riskless alternative.
The Korean government planned to produce 680 K2 tanks. Additionally, the K2 program included
spares for a total planned procurement. We added 10% for spare parts. Thus, the total powerpack
production quantity is 748. In Table 1, the program estimated the unit cost to develop the powerpack
(Engine and Transmission) would be $1.1M, which is $0.3M less than the cost to purchase it. Table 2
shows the unit price and quantity.
Table 2. Unit price and quantity.





Total Cost ($M) (All Costs or
Benefits Are in the Millions.)
Development Engine 0.50 680 (748) ** 200
Transmission 0.60 680 (748) 200 $822.8M
Technology Introduction * Engine 0.50 680 (748) -
Transmission 0.60 680 (748) - $822.8M
Purchase
Engine 0.90 680 (748) -
Transmission 0.50 680 (748) - $1047.2M
* Production costs are equal to domestic development. ** Considering the Spare volume of 10%.
The development cost for the powerpack is $53M for the engine and $47M for the transmission.
The direct benefit of engine development is $0.4M compared to purchase, and the transmission is
minus $0.1M. That is a $0.3M benefit per powerpack. Total direct profit can be obtained by multiplying
748 units, which is the total quantity of production.
In the case of indirect profit, the unit price of the powerpack (engine and transmission) is




V1 = value at period 1
r = discount rate
n = number of periods
We estimate the export quantity to be 200 units based on analogy to Korea’s K9 self-propelled
artillery, which has been produced since 1999 and has been exported at about 184 units overseas since
2017 (India 100 units, Finland 48 units, Estonia 12 units, and Norway 24 units; we exclude exports to
Turkey, because Turkey had imported technology from Korea and produced the K2 tank in Turkey).
Assuming that K2 tanks are exported in similar quantities as the K9 self-propelled artillery, more than
200 powerpacks will be exported. After 20 years from the initial mass production, there will be benefits for
export. Therefore, applying the social discount rate of 5.5% in Korea, the present value of exports is $75.4M.
In the case of technology introduction and purchase, export is impossible, because it had to be
approved by the technology owner’s or original manufacturer’s government. Of course, although it
seems possible to export given the present situation, it was impossible in the initial decision stage.
If we ignore the risks associated with development, then the development alternative has a cost
savings of $199.8M over purchasing the powerpacks. Benefits associated with development include
obtaining the technology domestically and not relying on foreign contractors to meet Korea’s defense
needs. Table 3 summarizes the results.
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Table 3. Total cost savings over purchasing.
Alternatives ($M) R&D Cost(A)
Direct Savings Due to
Lower Unit Cost (B)
Indirect Savings Due to
Export Sales (C)
Total Savings
(D = B + C − A)
Development Engine 53 224.4 = (0.40 − 0.10) × 748 75.4 = (1.10×200)




224.4 = (0.40 − 0.10) × 748 - 124.4 = 224.4 − 100Transmission 47
Purchase
Engine - - - -
Transmission - - - -
3.2.2. Actual Acquisition Experience versus the Planned Acquisition
This section compares the actual acquisition experience of the K2 tank to what was expected or
planned in the beginning of the acquisition program. In Table 4, engine development was successful in
2015, but transmission development was not successful until 2017. The development period of the
powerpack was delayed from 6 years to 13 years and developers had to spend an additional $ 89M in
the delayed periods. Korea DoD decided to import the powerpack and use it for the first production in
2012. Since then, Korea DoD has decided to use the developed engine and imported transmissions for
a second production of the K2 Tank in 2018.
Table 4. Expected value versus actual value.





100% Succeed in 2015




11 Years (2005–2015) - First Extension: ~2011
- Second Extension: ~2012




Budget Risk Engine $53M $93M = 53M + 8 × 5M
Additional Cost
- $ 8M/year




680 Units (748) * 306 Units (331)
K2 Tank Production Plan
- First Production: 100 (Until 2015) **
- Second Production: 106 (Until 2020)
- Second Production: 106 (Until 2020)Transmission
* Considering the Spare volume of 10%. ** Powerpacks were purchased, the original plan was 2012.
We calculated the benefits through the K2 tank development record. Finally, the development of
the K2 powerpack was a $59.5M loss compared to the purchasing of the K2 powerpack. The damage
can be even bigger considering the partners who invested in advance in preparation for the powerpack
mass production.
The developed engine costs $0.4M less than the purchased engine. The production volume was
decreased to 206 (221, with 10% spare volume) units because 100 units of powerpacks were imported
in 2012 to satisfy the demand from the K2 tank procurement. In addition, the Korean DoD failed to
successfully develop the transmission and the Korean DoD decided to abandon domestic production
and purchase the transmissions from a foreign contractor. Thus, we calculated the benefits based on
221 engine units except transmission units. As can be seen, Korea DoD actually spent $59.5M more
than if they purchased the powerpacks.
In fact, the unit price of developed transmissions is more expensive than the purchased one,
so there is no direct cost savings. If the Korean DoD bought transmissions and purchased the engine
technology, it could save $35.4M. Table 5 shows the results.
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Table 5. Actual Costs.
Alternatives ($M) R&D Cost(A)
Direct Savings Compared
to Purchasing (B)
Indirect Savings Due to Export
Sales (C), Discount Rate 5.5% Total Savings (D = B + C − A)
Development Engine 93 88.4 = 0.40 × 221 41.1 =
(0.50×200)
(1+0.055)20 −59.5 = 88.4 + 41.1 − 93 − 96
Transmission 96 - -
Technology
Introduction *
Engine 53 88.4 = 0.40 − 221 - 35.4 = 88.4 − 53
Transmission - - - -
Purchase
Engine - - - -
Transmission - - - -
* Reference for comparison.
3.3. Decision Tree with Real Options
The development of the K2 powerpack ended in failure. Engine development solved major flaws
and passed the first product inspection in 2015, but the transmission development did not meet the
no-defect criteria for 320 h (9600 km) by 2017. The main cause of failure was reliability, not performance.
The Korea Ministry of National Defense, which can no longer delay the deployment of the K2 tanks,
decided in February 2018 to import the transmissions from Germany. South Korea has not secured
transmission technology, and the possibility of exporting powerpacks has declined. In addition,
the K2 program was delayed by three years due to the powerpack. In hindsight, purchasing would
have been a better choice.
By applying real options to the powerpack development case, we show how real options can
help a stakeholder decide on an acquisition strategy. The real option is used as part of the Decision
Tree Model.
3.3.1. Decision Tree Modeling
We analyze the development of powerpack without options and with options.
Powerpack with no Options
Figures 1 and 2 are decision trees for powerpack development. Figure 1 shows the program’s
planned development of the powerpack over a six-year duration. The rectangle represents the
behavior or state, the circle is the uncertainty, and the triangle represents the terminal. Alternative A:
Development begins and development progresses for six years. Since then, the development has been
successful, and the mass production stage is ongoing. Benefits are calculated according to market
uncertainty. R&D uncertainty is 100% probability of success, and market uncertainty indicates that
a certain quantity is 100%. R&D uncertainty can be treated as variable, but, in this study, it was
used only as a distinction between success and failure. In other words, we did not calculate the
expected value due to R&D uncertainty (the probability of success), because the focus of this study
is not to increase the probability of success or to find out. Market uncertainty (quantity) means that
the probability of occurrence of a specific terminal (triangle) is 100%. The terminal is calculated as a
triangular distribution, so there is no need to show several terminals.
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Figure 2 shows the program extensions, if the program is unable to develop the powerpack in 
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extend the development. The extended development period is expressed as a period from 1 to 10 
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si ears. e ass e t e progra is extended in one-year increments. We have to decide whether
to extend the development. The exten ed development period is expressed s a period from 1 to
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10 years. Development periods are listed to facilitate comparison of the benefits of each period.
Market uncertainty is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure 3 is a decision tre for Technology Introduction and Purchase. There is no R&D uncertainty.
Technology Introduction has only market uncertainty, which is the same as in Figure 1. The benefit of
purchase is constant 0.
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Powerpack with Options
If the powerpack development has already started, it is not easy to abandon the project.
Because there is a possibility of success in the future and the Korean DoD will lose the investment
cost. Especially in South Korea, only very few cases of weapons development have been stopped.
This is due to a culture that does not tolerate failure. Therefore, various options must be considered
when establishing an acquisition strategy. Developing all the subsystems necessary for the K2 tank
in Korea has advantages of securing the technology, but, if the quantity of production is small, it can
be more expensive than purchasing. Even if engines and transmissions are developed domestically,
many parts must be purchased overseas. This is because many engine and transmission components
are monopolized. Therefore, domestic development for export is a logical contradiction. If Korea
cannot export K2 tanks due to the purchased powerpack, K2 tanks can be exported, except without
powerpack. Therefore, we can think of the following conditions.
In Figure 4, if the development is not completed during the planned period, the following options
are added at Node A.
1. Development and Technology Introduction Options: Purchase engine and transmission
technology from overseas. uch development has already been completed. Since it has not
solved the major defects, the introduction of technology will make it easier to solve the problems
already experienced by developed countries.
2. Reduced Development Option: Produce a lower-reliability powerpack. The failure of Korea’s
powerpack development project is not due to lack of performance, but due to unreliability of
reliability standards. It is an option to introduce a lower-reliability powerpack. Because of the
large number of reserves to be prepared for failure, the actual benefit will be less.
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3.3.2. Decision Tree Valuation
Each decision tree evaluation was performed under the following conditions.
1. The initial investment in R&D: $100M
2. The additional investment cost for each extension period: $15M/year (max 10 years) (an
approximation dividing the development cost of $1M by the planned development period
of six years)
3. The quantity: 200–800 units (most likely 400)
4. The export quantity: 50–200 (most likely 100)
5. The reduced rate f estic r cti tit : its extended year (set t e i i
value considering the production capacity of K2 tank is 50 units per year; because produced
K2 tanks cannot be operated without a powerpack, the total quantity of powerpacks ust
reduced by the nu ber of po erpacks purchased)
. The reduced rate of export quantity: 5 units/extended year
. The discount rate: 5.5% [54]
. Comparisons are perfor ed ith PV ( et Present l ) [ , ]
9. The development and technology introduction option cost: $0 /year, and can be developed
within two years because we have already secured development equipment and technical
know-how through development; considering the cost of purchasing technology, it was estimated
to double the cost of extension
10. The reduced development option cost: $15M/year, which has a benefit of 80% of the base product,
and can be developed within two years.
The simulation was performed in the case of completion of the development within the period,
the case of the extension of the development period from 1 to 10 years, and the case of the technology
introduction. The simulation assumes that the production quantity follows a triangular distribution
and Monte Carlo simulation was carried out 10,000 times. Table 6 shows the simulation conditions.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 2 2
Domestic
Production
High 800 780 760 740 720 700 680 660 640 620 600 800 760 760
Medium 400 380 360 340 320 300 280 260 240 220 200 400 360 360
Small 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 200 160 160
Benefit per unit 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Cost 100 115 130 145 160 175 190 205 220 235 250 100 130 130
Discount rate 5.50%
Export
High 200 195 190 185 180 175 170 165 160 155 150 - - -
Medium 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 - - -
Small 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 - - -
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4. Results and Analysis
4.1. Powerpack with No Options
Figure 5 shows the simulation result of each case. From the right side, the benefit of planned period
and one-year extension, Technology Introduction and 2–5-year extension are plotted. Purchase is
0 vertical line. All benefit is net present value.
In the case of a three-year extension, we can see that it has a lower benefit than the purchase
with a probability of about 40%. With five-year extension, the probability of obtaining the benefit is
very low.
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In Table 7, if the production quantity is medium, there will be benefits up to two-year extension
and the probability of benefit is 60%. If production quantity is high, there will be benefits up to a
five-year extension and the probability of benefit is 15%.
In Table 8, if the benefit cost ratio is greater than 1, the project is considered economically
viable [57]. Cost-Benefit ratio (B/C) is greater than 1 when project is completed within two-year
extension and technology introduction with high quantity production. Considering only the average
values, development and technology introduction are not economically feasible.
If the strategy of acquisition is not determined, we can choose the following acquisition strategies
(see Table 9).
1. Development: Select when production quantity is high and development is possible within
seven years.
2. Purchase: Select when development is expected to take more than eight years, or when production
quantity is medium or small.
3. Technology Introduction: Select when production quantity is high and develop ent is expected
to take ore than seven years.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 (Year)
Min −19.71 −49.52 −66.54 −81.25 −94.60 −106.65 −116.43 −125.34 −134.12 −140.50 −146.03 −39.54
25% Percentile 38.64 −1.38 −21.12 −38.42 −53.78 −67.74 −79.89 −90.47 −100.80 −108.95 −116.22 5.02
Median 78.41 31.41 9.80 −8.30 −25.52 −42.00 −54.55 −66.89 −77.88 −86.94 −94.86 34.87
Mean 83.81 36.10 14.10 −4.41 −22.21 −38.05 −51.38 −63.81 −74.57 −84.30 −92.38 38.99
75% Percentile 155.36 94.91 69.71 47.23 27.86 10.10 −6.80 −20.73 −34.16 −45.85 −56.60 94.15
Max 213.71 143.05 115.12 90.06 68.69 49.01 29.74 14.14 −0.83 −14.30 −26.79 138.71
0 Benefit Percent 2% 20% 40% 58% 73% 85% 93% 98% 100% 100% 100% 16%
Standard Deviation 49.27 40.41 38.23 36.41 34.50 33.04 31.07 29.65 27.87 26.39 25.14 37.63





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 (Year)
Min −0.21 −0.36 −0.46 −0.54 −0.59 −0.63 −0.65 −0.67 −0.68 −0.69 −0.69 −0.39
25% Percentile 0.38 0.13 −0.05 −0.18 −0.28 −0.35 −0.41 −0.45 −0.48 −0.51 −0.53 0.05
Median 0.78 0.47 0.24 0.05 −0.07 −0.17 −0.24 −0.30 −0.35 −0.39 −0.42 0.36
Mean 0.83 0.51 0.27 0.09 −0.04 −0.14 −0.22 −0.29 −0.33 −0.37 −0.40 0.40
75% Percentile 1.55 1.10 0.77 0.53 0.34 0.19 0.07 −0.02 −0.09 −0.16 −0.21 0.94
Max 2.13 1.59 1.17 0.88 0.65 0.46 0.31 0.20 0.11 0.02 −0.05 1.39
0 B/C Percent 3% 11% 24% 43% 59% 73% 84% 92% 97% 100% 100% 16%
Standard Deviation 0.49 0.41 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.38
Table 9. Acquisition Strategy.
Items Development Period (Years)
Quantity 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Low P P P P P P P P P P P
Medium P P P P P P P P P P P
High D D T T T T T T T T T
D, Development; P, Purchase; T, Technology Introduction.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3866 14 of 18
4.2. Powerpack with Options
Figure 6 shows the simulation result with options. From the right side, one-year extension,
two-year extension, reduced development option, three-year extension, and development and
technology introduction option are plotted. In the case of the reduced development option, we can see
that it has a higher benefit than the three-year extension.
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Figure 6. Results of simulation (with options).
In Table 10, through the options, we can complete the project in eight years and expect an average
benefit from $11.15M to $36.10M. We can mitigate development risks and losses through our decision.
The amount of reduced loss is the value of the real options. If the planned development fails, we can
choose the following options.
1. Continue Development: Select when development success potential is very high in two years.
2. The Reduced Development option: Select when development is expected to extend beyond
three years.
3. Development and Technology Introduction: Select when the user requires 100% performance
and we cannot solve a technical problem and the probability of success is very low.
Table 10. Comparing Benefit with options.
Powerpack Benefit
Extended R&D Development and Technology Introduction Reduced Development
1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 2-Year 2-Year
Min −49.52 −66.54 −81.25 −110.78 −66.99
25% Percentile −1.38 −21.12 −38.42 −66.55 −22.95
Median 31.41 9.80 −8.30 −36.78 7.72
Mean 36.10 14.10 −4.41 −32.58 11.15
75% Percentile 94.91 69.71 47.23 21.90 65.14
Max 143.05 115.12 90.06 66.12 109.19
0 Benefit Percent 20% 40% 58% 79% 43%
Standard Deviation 40.41 38.23 36.41 37.51 37.29
The third option is better than the K2 powerpack case. Because the development of the
K2 powerpack was delayed by seven years, the transmission failed, and lost $ 59.5M.
5. Discussion
In this case study, the real option valuation methodology was applied to the finished project, while
the existing research mainly analyzed the value of R&D by applying real options before development.
From the case study of t e develo ment of the powerpack, we learned the foll wing lessons.
First, we reaffirmed the importance of objective value analysis in project decisi making.
The K2 tank powerpack development project was rec gnized as a project with low development
profit and high risk from the start of the project planning. However, the project was carried out
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in anticipation of localization and export. Korean DoD did not judge the value of project benefit
quantitatively, but rather carried out the project by overestimating the social benefit qualitatively.
The results of our real options analysis clearly demonstrate this fact.
Second, we need to analyze a project value continuously and revise the strategy.
The K2 powerpack development project was not able to do so, even though it had to revise its
project strategy according to changes in the external environment and project progress. Based on
such changes as delays in development, reduced production of K2 tanks, and purchase of Apache
helicopters, the Korean Ministry of National Defense had to consider the transition from development
to technology introduction or purchase. In other words, based on updated information at each decision
stage, options such as “option to scale”, “abandon”, and “switch” had to be considered.
Third, the effectiveness of real option valuation was confirmed for sustainable defense
management. By adding the Reduced Development option, and the Development and Technology
Introduction option, we were able to present a reasonable exit strategy in a project that was delaying
development. It is necessary to accumulate rational benefit calculation data that can be used for the
benefit analysis of R&D through continuous real option analysis for finished projects. In this way,
the real option valuation will be more effective.
In addition, the methodology used in this study can be used not only in the field of defense
research and development but also in the field of commercial research and development. This is
because general product acquisition strategies are development, technology introduction (or patent
license purchase), and purchase (or lease). If the expected final product quantity is highly volatile,
the process shown in Figure 7 can be used to valuate options benefit for establishing a new product
acquisition strategy. The real option analysis data acquired from similar finished projects can be useful
for establishing a new product acquisition strategy and at every decision-making phase, the real option
evaluation should be continuously performed with updated information.Sustainability 2018, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW  16 of 19 
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In Korea, most public investment projects are conducted through cost–benefit analysis, while
cost-effectiveness analysis is mainly applied to weapon systems acquisition projects. Cost–benefit
analysis has yet to be applied. The cost–benefit analysis seeks to maximize social net benefits by
measuring the costs and benefits of the entire population, however applying the social cost–benefit
analysis when generating costs and be efits for limited users or producers, such s acquiring weapon
systems, is somewhat limited. In this paper, we first performed real option valuation including the
cost–benefit analysis of finished weapon systems in the Korean defense field. In addition, this paper is
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valuable in establishing a rational methodology for applying economic analysis to weapon systems
acquisition projects. The contributions of this paper are summarized in Table 11.
Table 11. Contribution table in defense field.





Old • New R&D Project N/A (only cost-effectiveness analysis) N/A
• Limited (only
initial phase) N/A
New (in this paper)
• Finished R&D Project
• New R&D Project
• Net Present Value
• Cost–benefit analysis
• Real Option Valuation
• Available • Every decisionmaking phase • Available
6. Conclusions
We analyzed the K2 tank powerpack development case by applying real options. We could
see that the real options reduced the risk of failure and losses when the development risk is high
and market uncertainty exists. We compared powerpack development, technology introduction,
and purchasing solution. Monte Carlo simulation was performed using decision trees and real options.
We analyzed the derived NPV and B/C and found the best alternative.
We recommend that the methodology used in the case study be used in the decision-making
process of weapon system acquisition strategy and project execution. From before the start of the
project to the completion of the project, if the real option is used at the time of decision making, it can
help the decision maker make a rational choice.
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